Mark Stout is Program Director, Masters in Global Security Studies, in the School of Arts and Sciences, Advanced Academic Programs at Johns Hopkins University
He worked for thirteen years as an intelligence analyst, first with the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research and later with the CIA. He has also worked on the Army Staff in the Pentagon and at the Institute for Defense Analyses. In addition, Mr. Stout is a Lecturer at Johns Hopkins University’s Krieger School of Arts and Sciences where he teaches course on intelligence and strategic studies. He has degrees from Stanford and Harvard Universities and in 2010 he completed his PhD in history at the University of Leeds in the United Kingdom where he wrote his dissertation on American intelligence in World War I. Mr. Stout is the co-author of three books and has published articles in Intelligence and National Security, Studies in Intelligence, The Journal of Strategic Studies, and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism.
American Spy Chiefs
In the public imagination, spy chiefs, the heads of American intelligence agencies, are often portrayed as immensely immensely powerful individuals who are secretly lurking in the shadows to manipulate the world to be not as it seems. But has this been true in the United States? And what does it take to be an effective spy chief?
Intelligence and American Presidents
These days, the fraught relationship between the President and the US Intelligence Community is often in the news. But no American president since World War II has had stress-free dealings with intelligence. Learn about the love-hate relationships between some of our most important modern Presidents and their intelligence agencies.
American Intelligence during World War I: On the Home Front and on the Battlefield
In the United States, World War I is often a forgotten war but it was a tremendously important time in American intelligence. Important new technologies such as aerial reconnaissance and signals intelligence and an intense focus on domestic security and counterintelligence helped win the war and shape American intelligence to this very day.
The Spy Museum does not endorse, approve, or support the opinions stated by the speakers. Statements made by presenters do not represent the position or opinion of the International Spy Museum.